Collective Welfare and Political Interests in Electoral Policy: A Utilitarian Analysis of Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2022

General Background Electoral rules structurally dictate political competition, establishing institutional arrangements that determine voter participation, technological integration, result verification, and public confidence. Specific Background Nigeria’s Electoral Act 2022 introduced critical statutory innovations, particularly mandatory technological accreditation and electronic result transmission, to counteract historical electoral manipulations and declining citizen trust. Knowledge Gap Although legal analyses assess the formal provisions of the Act, current literature frequently isolates statutory reform from the practical realities of administrative capacity, political incentive structures, and the equitable realization of collective welfare during implementation. Aims This study examines the tension between collective welfare objectives and political interests in Nigeria’s electoral policy by analyzing the policy-utility gap between statutory intent and practical implementation during the 2023 general elections. Results Utilizing utilitarianism and Public Choice Theory alongside Aristotle’s concept of the common good, the analysis reveals that progressive legal features were significantly undermined by logistical failures, discretionary ambiguity in result management (specifically regarding the IReV portal), and political violence. These implementation deficits generated high social costs and disparate access to electoral safeguards across regions, failing to translate statutory progress into universally accessible democratic welfare. Novelty The research uniquely synthesizes utilitarian evaluation and Aristotelian equity to demonstrate that the democratic value of electoral reform lies not in statutory language but in strictly limiting institutional discretion and neutralizing adverse political incentives during implementation. Implications Future electoral reforms must legally formalize specific institutional accountability mechanisms, mandate nationwide technological stress-testing prior to elections, and systematically restrict administrative discretion to shield execution from particularistic political manipulation. Highlights: Progressive statutory provisions do not guarantee collective welfare if implementation suffers from logistical failures and discretionary ambiguity. Public Choice Theory explains how political incentives actively distort the execution of well-designed electoral technology and rules. Electoral policy must integrate strict institutional accountability and mandatory technology testing to close the policy-utility gap. Keywords: Electoral Policy. Collective Welfare. Political Interests. Policy Implementation. Utilitarianism