Electricity supplier selection among large industrial consumers in Colombia: Evidence from procurement managers

Large consumers in liberalized electricity markets rarely choose a supplier on price alone, yet electricity procurement research has concentrated on pricing, contract design and market structure rather than on how organizations evaluate competing suppliers. Drawing on Organizational Buying Behavior (OBB) and Buying Center Theory, this study examines supplier selection among thirteen large non-regulated consumers in Colombia's hydro-dominated electricity market. Semi-structured interviews with procurement managers were analyzed thematically. Managers described five groups of supplier attributes: price and cost predictability, generation backing and financial robustness, reputation and track record, renewable attributes, and technical support and value-added services. Competitive pricing operated as a threshold condition; the choice among acceptable offers depended on whether a supplier appeared able to honor a long-term contract under stressed market conditions, and reputation served as a proxy for capabilities that buyers cannot easily verify in advance. On this basis, the study proposes a market-conditioned framework in which wholesale-price volatility, hydrological variability, generation adequacy and counterparty exposure shape organizational priorities, which procurement managers reconcile when evaluating supplier attributes. The framework separates supplier attributes from the organizational, interpersonal and individual processes through which they are judged, and it distinguishes direct interview evidence, managers' reported accounts of organizational processes, interpretation grounded in the Colombian market context, and theoretical propositions. The study contributes to electricity procurement research by explaining supplier choice as a risk-allocation decision rather than a price comparison and by specifying which of its mechanisms may transfer to other liberalized markets.