The Original Sin of Epistemology

This paper investigates the possibility of globally independent propositions, statements that hold true across all cognitive frameworks without relying on prior initial presuppositions, and the existence of a universally valid meta-method M. Adopting the methodological principle of deassertion (stripping philosophical systems •ᵢ of their assertoric force while actively navigating between their internal derivations), the essay examines primary candidates for presuppositionless truth: inescapable propositions derived via retorsive arguments and Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. While these candidates successfully bypass the internalist Münchhausen trilemma within rational cognition (ℜ), their global independence remains contingent upon refuting non-rational cognition (¬ℜ). To explain how thought navigates the resulting epistemic labyrinth prior to formal justification, the paper introduces the concept of vitalisms — pre-reflective orientations that guide the trajectory of reasoning. Finally, through a quasi-formal trilemma, it is demonstrated that no universally valid method M can adjudicate between ℜ and ¬ℜ without falling into self-undermining falsity, triviality, or vicious circularity. Consequently, the thesis T ("globally independent propositions do not exist") functions as an immanent limitative theorem within ℜ, reconciling Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics locally with Hans Albert’s critical rationalism globally.