Supranational Integration, Administrative Gradualism, and Democratic Legitimacy — A Comparative European Structural Model (French Adaptation)

This paper outlines a comparative structural framework for analyzing how judicial rulings from supranational courts (specifically the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU preliminary references and the ECHR) systematically transform domestic policy parameters without explicit legislative mandates. Adapted specifically to the institutional mechanics of the French legal order, the framework operationalizes four key structural components: Judicial Displacement (JD): The structural mechanism through which supranational courts assume primary interpretative authority over national policy, constrained in France by Article 55 of the Constitution. Administrative Gradualism (AG): The incremental realignment of domestic policy through an iterative sequence of secondary executive and regulatory instruments (décrets, arrêtés, circulaires, and administrative guidance) issued by ministries and independent regulatory bodies (e.g., CNIL, ARCOM). The Mandate Scale (M_0–M_3): A heuristic metric assessing the spectrum of explicit democratic authorization present within electoral manifestos, winning coalitions, or direct referendums regarding supranational constraints. Four-Step Operational Cycle: A recurring sequence mapping the trajectory from supranational judicial trigger \rightarrow national administrative response (expanding, reclaiming, or accommodating) \rightarrow democratic legitimacy deficits (input, throughput, output) \rightarrow systemic political outcomes (evolutionary pushback via contrôle de conventionnalité or systemic backlash). The paper includes a comparative matrix contrasting UK statutory mechanism (HRA 1998, Statutory Instruments) against French constitutional pathways (Sarran, Nicolo, Article 38 ordonnances), along with a rigorous methodology defining a "True-Negative Profile" to test boundary conditions against selection bias. Note on Origin & Systemic Scope: This publication represents an operational draft outline designed to establish baseline terminology, structural mechanics, and theoretical metrics for ongoing comparative legal research. This work is a direct spin-off and structural adaptation of the foundational framework established in: Davidson, C. K. S., Judicial Displacement and Administrative Gradualism, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24023708. While the original benchmark paper evaluated these dynamics within a dualist, parliamentary context (specifically United Kingdom immigration policy and prisoner voting rights under ECHR jurisprudence), this adaptation recalibrates the core analytical model to the monist-leaning, semi-presidential institutional architecture of the French Fifth Republic under Article 55 of the 1958 French Constitution. This draft serves as the immediate European adaptation within a broader comparative research agenda, with future planned adaptations extending the framework to examine administrative realignments, executive rule-making, and judicial review dynamics within the United States constitutional framework.