How M&A Contracts Can Prevent Corporate Collapse

Buying a company is not instant. After a merger agreement is signed, it can take months before the deal closes and ownership changes hands. During that time, markets can fall, buyers can lose their nerve, and money can disappear. This paper asks how the protective clauses in buyout contracts keep companies from collapsing during this waiting period. It studies three real cases: Elon Musk's 2022 deal to buy Twitter, Bank of America's purchase of Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis, and the fight between Dow Chemical and Rohm and Haas in 2008 and 2009. Across these cases, the paper looks at three contract tools. The first is the material adverse effect (MAE) clause, an escape hatch that buyers can use only after a severe, lasting blow to the target company. The second is the ordinary course requirement, which obliges the target company to keep running its business normally until closing. The third is specific performance, a court order that forces a party to complete the deal. The paper finds that these rules work as safety guardrails. They stop buyers from backing out just because the market turns bad. They protect buyers from truly serious losses. They also protect sellers if a buyer's cash suddenly vanishes.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Student Journal of Business and Economics
Published
2026-11-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.67521/sjbe.2026.040
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

How M&A Contracts Can Prevent Corporate Collapse

Faisal Alhudaithi
Student Journal of Business and Economics
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

How M&A Contracts Can Prevent Corporate Collapse

Faisal Alhudaithi
article en

Abstract

Buying a company is not instant. After a merger agreement is signed, it can take months before the deal closes and ownership changes hands. During that time, markets can fall, buyers can lose their nerve, and money can disappear. This paper asks how the protective clauses in buyout contracts keep companies from collapsing during this waiting period. It studies three real cases: Elon Musk's 2022 deal to buy Twitter, Bank of America's purchase of Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis, and the fight between Dow Chemical and Rohm and Haas in 2008 and 2009. Across these cases, the paper looks at three contract tools. The first is the material adverse effect (MAE) clause, an escape hatch that buyers can use only after a severe, lasting blow to the target company. The second is the ordinary course requirement, which obliges the target company to keep running its business normally until closing. The third is specific performance, a court order that forces a party to complete the deal. The paper finds that these rules work as safety guardrails. They stop buyers from backing out just because the market turns bad. They protect buyers from truly serious losses. They also protect sellers if a buyer's cash suddenly vanishes.

Student Journal of Business and EconomicsVol. 1(5)
Openalex Percentile: Top 13%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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