Publication, DURC, or Perishing: Research Competition Without Malice Accelerates the Democratization of Bioterrorism

Even when scientists have no intention of committing terrorism, the democratization of bioterrorism would approach rapidly if the number of newly discovered bacteria and viruses is rewarded as research output and if scientists respond to the interest of development itself, the desire to leave a record of their achievements, and publish-or-perish pressure. Competition among researchers acting without malicious intent can lead to many newly identified organisms that make bioterrorism easier. Work that remains unpublished brings no recognition and does not count as established evidence, so researchers publish, and the knowledge becomes accessible to anyone. AI has already become skilled at explaining chemistry and biotechnology to anyone, and restrictions imposed by a few AI companies are meaningless if other companies do not stop. Redaction leaves even researchers unable to verify the work, and the danger itself can then no longer be demonstrated. When the accumulation of research and publication undertaken in good faith increases the possibility of use by people with malicious intent, where should the boundaries on research acceleration and disclosure be placed?