Nuclear Black Box and the Vulnerabilities of Verified Non-Proliferation

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has played an important role in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. However, its legal framework contains a significant imbalance. While the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states are supported by an international safeguards system, the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments remains difficult to assess. The continued modernisation of nuclear arsenals and the failure of the 2026 NPT Review Conference to adopt a consensus substantive outcome have brought renewed attention to this problem. This paper examines the difference between the legal obligations established under Articles II, III and VI of the NPT and the institutional arrangements available for reviewing their implementation. It introduces the concept of the “Nuclear Black Box” to describe the gap between the legal recognition of disarmament obligations and the ability of existing institutions to consistently assess their fulfilment. The paper argues that the Treaty’s central weakness lies in the limited continuity and accountability of its review process along with its unequal structure. This is based on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, successive NPT Review Conferences, and recent proposals for greater transparency. It proposes an evidence-based implementation record that would utilise national reports, identify unresolved disagreements, and track commitments across review cycles, including the times when consensus cannot be reached. The paper concludes by emphasising that strengthening disarmament accountability within the existing treaty framework is essential to maintain the credibility of international nuclear non-proliferation.