Escaping the Epistemic Void: The Non-Uniformity of Causal Effects as a Refutation of Climenhaga's Bayesian Trap
Nevin Climenhaga’s "Bayesian trap" poses a severe systemic challenge to skeptical theism. It argues that if the conditional probability of evil given theism—P(E|T)—is inscrutable, the posterior probability of theism—P(T|E)—becomes equally uncomputable, trapping the theist in a forced collapse into agnosticism. Traditional salvific strategies (including the Asymmetry Defense, Rough Bounds Counter, and Reformed Epistemology) attempt to mitigate this trap but often leave its core mathematical architecture unchallenged. This paper presents a definitive refutation of Climenhaga’s trap by deploying the Argument from the Non-Uniformity of Causal Effects. By shifting the domain of inquiry from the inscrutable moral psychology of the divine to the mathematically rigorous topography of structural causal models, we demonstrate that P(E|T) is fundamentally bounded. Because localized micro-level causal variations generate radically non-uniform, chaotic, and cascading macroscopic counterfactual realities, the structural integrity of a law-governed cosmic matrix inherently conditions the probability of localized states. Consequently, the formal apparatus of the Bayesian trap fails to snap shut.
Authors
- Humphrey Beña (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-0606-2927)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Knowledge Commons (Lakehead University)
- Published
- 2026-11-07
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.17613/2h7bn-7qh43
- Primary Topic
- Theology and Philosophy of Evil
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00