A large scale crisis: The Hopen accident and the struggle against the Soviet autonomy on Svalbard

This article examines the handling of the Hopen crisis of 1978 in light of the overall effort by the Norwegian authorities to curtail the self-rule, or autonomy, of the Soviet mining towns on Svalbard. By supplementing and defragmenting the existing accounts of the event, it investigates its causes, management and consequences in relation to this effort, and asks how the Soviets responded to it, which factors led to its successful resolution and whether it strengthened Norwegian sovereignty. The article argues that the Norwegian non-interference policy had given the Soviet mining towns an autonomy they sought to protect. When oil exploration forced the Norwegian government to adopt a more active Svalbard policy, the Soviets refused to respect the unilaterally enacted Norwegian legislation and the governor’s police authority. The Hopen crisis was used to reverse precedents, but met with firm opposition from the Soviets who attempted to foil the investigation by recourse to international law, political pressure and outright threats. Despite missteps, the crisis was brought to a successful end by the governor reaching the scene first and securing vital pieces of the wreckage. An increased willingness by the Norwegian government to infringe on Soviet security interests, while relying on NATO security guarantees, helped Norway to stand up to the Soviet pressure and complete the investigation, bringing the crisis to a successful end. This constituted a clear breakthrough in the Norwegian Svalbard policy. Although it does not appear to have brought more Soviet respect for Norwegian sovereignty or greater Norwegian freedom of action in Svalbard policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, its limited foreign relations fallout gave the Norwegian government the reassurance to pursue the same course of action further into the 1980s.