Il senso del dovere nell’età dei diritti

This article examines the meaning of the sense of duty in the age of rights, focusing on its subjective dimension and its relevance to the practical realization of human rights. Starting from the relationship between rights and duties in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it proposes a grammatical clarification of the sense of duty through Kant’s distinctions between acting in accordance with duty and acting from duty, and between perfect and imperfect duties. The latter are particularly significant because they bind individuals without prescribing in advance the specific actions through which they must be fulfilled. The sense of duty is therefore understood as a practical disposition through which individuals recognize the normative force of duty and responsibly determine its concrete realization. Drawing on Amartya Sen’s account of human rights and contemporary approaches to solidarity, the article explores how this disposition takes shape in interpersonal relationships and contributes to solidarity at the group and institutional levels. It argues that the effective realization of human rights depends not only on the fulfillment of specific obligations but also on forms of responsibility grounded in the recognition of the equal dignity of every person.