Inside and outside lobbying under democratic backsliding
This article examines how democratic backsliding affects civil society organizations’ (CSOs) lobbying strategies. Using an original survey of Hungarian CSOs, we investigate how an exclusionary political environment influences one of the most fundamental choices for advocacy and lobbying: the choice between inside lobbying (strategies aimed at decision makers) and outside lobbying (strategies targeting the broader public). Our findings show that outside lobbying is mainly driven by perceptions of closing political opportunity structures and by being a membership-based organization. In contrast, inside lobbying is a strategy employed predominantly by sectoral and professional organizations operating at the national level that depend on government funding and are ideologically closer to the Hungarian ruling party FIDESZ. The article contributes to understanding how CSOs navigate a shrinking civic space and adapt to political constraints.
Authors
- Áron Buzogány (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9867-3742)
- Rafael Labanino (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5518-0748)
- Márton Gerő (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4372-7464)
Institutions
- Eötvös Loránd University (HU)
- College of Europe (BE)
- Nürtingen-Geislingen University of Applied Science (DE)
- BOKU University (AT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Democratization
- Published
- 2026-11-06
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2026.2754180
- Primary Topic
- Political Theory and Democracy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
- Austrian Science Fund
- Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
- Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem
- Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung