What would count as a theory of the self?

Abstract The concept of the self is the concept of what makes a person the person that they are. But how can a general, theoretical account be given of something that is, by definition, specific to each individual? Discussions of selfhood in the analytic tradition have focused on three different issues: (1) self-reference in language and thought, (2) the epistemology of self-knowledge, (3) the metaphysics/ontology of selves. These are all connected to each other and all important. But even if we had satisfactory answers to all of them, we would have at best an account of the formal conditions of selfhood, rather than of selfhood itself. Focusing primarily on ancient Greece, this paper explores an alternative approach to thinking about selfhood. Individuality, selfhood, can only be expressed within certain limits and certain structures. When we look at historical texts, if we seek to find an author’s conception of the self, we need to tease out how they frame those factors that constrain and channel the development, articulation, and expression of selfhood - as opposed, for example, to looking at whatever metaphysical account they might give of the mind or of personhood (or of the uniquely Greek concept of the psuchē ).