Hidden Games: Expanding the Aperture of Civil–Military Relations Theory

This article aims to make sense of two seemingly separate problems plaguing civil–military relations in democratic states today: uncertainty regarding how military officers should respond to a lack of civilian guidance, which creates intolerable tension with military doctrine; and the even greater anxieties surrounding how military officers should respond to civilian guidance that transgresses existing civil–military norms. It provides an analytical lens that helps us understand these problems by updating the existing game theory model for military behavior to transition from a two-option game to a three-option game. The article thereby expands the aperture of the field, from three to nine templates of interaction (subdivided into good games, bad games, and ugly games). The article presents brief real-world vignettes for all nine templates, and concludes by indicating how the new model can help prepare officers to work with their civilian counterparts—even when their counterparts threaten democratic norms.