Political Legitimacy and the Limits of Power in Early Buddhism: A Critical Conceptual Study of the Pāli Nikāyas

This paper examines the justification of political authority in the Pāli Nikāyas and the extent to which this can provide a rationale for their moral claims. Situated within the field of comparative political theory, it employs a critical conceptual analysis of kingship, collective authorisation, welfare, coercion, deliberation, and the political-religious nexus, illuminated by detailed exegeses of the Aggañña, Cakkavattisīhanāda, Kūṭadanta and Mahāparinibbāna discourses, and contextualised against selected passages from the Majjhima, Saṃyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas. It demonstrates that these Nikāyas call for a conditional justification of government based on protection, material provision, ethical conduct and avoidance of social decay, but cannot provide a justification for popular sovereignty, citizenship, and what modern interpreters understand to be constitutional accountability. What makes their contribution unique is their demonstration of the reliance of political order on circumstances in which coercion can do nothing, and of the refutation of any moral immunity on the part of rulers qua sovereigns, due to royal descent bribery swordsmanship, etc. Their analysis separates justificatory from institutional constraints, and reveals an accountability vacuum at work in politically legitimate monarchy. It further illustrates how renunciation constrains the importance of political success, without dispelling political responsibility. This setup makes a number of contributions to political science, making clear the sources of resources and also the institutional constraints present in early Buddhist accounts of legitimacy without implying that they prefigured liberal-democratic ideas.