A Modal Explanationist Solution to the Gettier Problem

Abstract The Gettier problem suggests that the core challenge for theories of knowledge lies in eliminating knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. In response, two major approaches have emerged in contemporary epistemology: modalism and explanationism. However, both approaches have limitations and exhibit an interesting theoretical symmetry: while modalism effectively handles environmental luck, it struggles with certain cases of intervening luck; explanationism faces the reverse difficulty. This symmetrical limitation suggests that any theory of knowledge relying on a single dimension is likely to be inadequate. To address this, this paper presents a new, integrated approach – Modal Explanationism (ME). ME requires that a belief counts as knowledge just in case it is explained by the truth of the believed proposition in the actual world, and that this explanatory connection is preserved across a range of nearby possible worlds. It is argued that ME offers a more successful solution to the Gettier problem than either modalism or explanationism alone.