1956 Suez Crisis: The Consolidation of the USSR and the United States as Global Powers

The Suez Crisis, which became a watershed in the transformation of the regional subsystem of international relations in the Middle East and, more broadly, in the emergence of the bipolar world order, has been extensively studied by both Russian and international scholars. Paradoxically, however, the roles played by the USSR and the United States at the various stages of the crisis have not previously been the subject of a dedicated scholarly study. This article seeks to address this gap through a systematic analysis of the dynamics of interaction between the two superpowers during the diplomatic and military phases of the crisis. To this end, the author situates the complex and often contradictory relationship between the USSR and the United States within the broader international context unfolding in the Middle East in the 1950s. The author concludes that, on the one hand, neither Moscow nor Washington sought to escalate the crisis triggered by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, despite their intensifying rivalry for influence in the region. On the other hand, at every stage of the crisis, the apparent unanimity between the two superpowers concealed fundamentally conflicting interests that impeded meaningful cooperation in the Middle East. Ultimately, the Suez Crisis drew the region further into the dynamics of bipolar confrontation, as Britain and France saw their dominant positions eroded while the USSR and the United States emerged as the principal external powers. At the same time, the Suez Crisis demonstrates that even at the height of the Cold War, the superpowers engaged in diplomatic dialogue in pursuit of compromise, while recourse to the international legal mechanisms of the United Nations helped bring the armed conflict to an end within a relatively short period, averting the risk of a global conflagration.