Network Intrusion Forensic Detection System with Explainable Artificial Intelligence and Digital Chain of Custody

Deploying an explainable intrusion detection model from a validated laboratory setting into a forensic workflow requires guarantees that benchmarks do not test: that the certified model is the exact artifact applied to a case, that heterogeneous evidence can be classified reliably, and that every step is verifiable. We present MODEXRE, a forensic pipeline that extends a previously validated synthetic-data-trained XGBoost classifier with SHAP explainability (Vela Alonso & Pellicer, 2026) into a dual-mode architecture: a Laboratory mode, where models are trained and certified on public and synthetic data, and a Formal mode, where a frozen, hash-verified model performs inference on case evidence under a SHA-256 hash-chained chain of custody. Suricata alerts, CEF firewall logs and packet captures are normalized through OCSF. Four design decisions, each triggered by an observed failure, shaped the architecture: a timestamp leak that inflated Kitsune performance (F1-macro 0.984, 0.662 after correction); a feature-coverage gap that made the 78-feature reference model misclassify a real SSH alert; causal temporal flow aggregation, which raised Kitsune multiclass F1-macro from 0.394 to 0.932; and a certification defect, exposed only by a real packet capture, whereby the pipeline had always trained a binary classifier. After correction, the same capture went from 100% of events flagged as malicious to 87% classified as Normal, with the scanning host identified as Reconnaissance. The default four-class certified model reaches F1-macro = 0.9538 on CICIDS2017-derived evidence; the recertified 18-category model reaches 0.6214, reflecting the real multiclass task. Chain-of-custody verification, model integrity hashing and per-prediction SHAP explanations are reported as measured outcomes. This work is the second part of a research line developed at CESTE University Center (Zaragoza, Spain), following "Forensic-Oriented Intrusion Detection Using Synthetic Network Traffic Data and Explainable Artificial Intelligence" (Vela Alonso & Pellicer, 2026).

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23952266
Primary Topic
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Type
preprint
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Network Intrusion Forensic Detection System with Explainable Artificial Intelligence and Digital Chain of Custody

José Luis Vela Alonso, Carmen Pellicer
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
preprint

Network Intrusion Forensic Detection System with Explainable Artificial Intelligence and Digital Chain of Custody

José Luis Vela Alonso, Carmen Pellicer
preprint en

Abstract

Deploying an explainable intrusion detection model from a validated laboratory setting into a forensic workflow requires guarantees that benchmarks do not test: that the certified model is the exact artifact applied to a case, that heterogeneous evidence can be classified reliably, and that every step is verifiable. We present MODEXRE, a forensic pipeline that extends a previously validated synthetic-data-trained XGBoost classifier with SHAP explainability (Vela Alonso & Pellicer, 2026) into a dual-mode architecture: a Laboratory mode, where models are trained and certified on public and synthetic data, and a Formal mode, where a frozen, hash-verified model performs inference on case evidence under a SHA-256 hash-chained chain of custody. Suricata alerts, CEF firewall logs and packet captures are normalized through OCSF. Four design decisions, each triggered by an observed failure, shaped the architecture: a timestamp leak that inflated Kitsune performance (F1-macro 0.984, 0.662 after correction); a feature-coverage gap that made the 78-feature reference model misclassify a real SSH alert; causal temporal flow aggregation, which raised Kitsune multiclass F1-macro from 0.394 to 0.932; and a certification defect, exposed only by a real packet capture, whereby the pipeline had always trained a binary classifier. After correction, the same capture went from 100% of events flagged as malicious to 87% classified as Normal, with the scanning host identified as Reconnaissance. The default four-class certified model reaches F1-macro = 0.9538 on CICIDS2017-derived evidence; the recertified 18-category model reaches 0.6214, reflecting the real multiclass task. Chain-of-custody verification, model integrity hashing and per-prediction SHAP explanations are reported as measured outcomes. This work is the second part of a research line developed at CESTE University Center (Zaragoza, Spain), following "Forensic-Oriented Intrusion Detection Using Synthetic Network Traffic Data and Explainable Artificial Intelligence" (Vela Alonso & Pellicer, 2026).

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Network Security and Intrusion Detection
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