Executive constraints and focal points: factors facilitating democratic breakdowns led by incumbents versus non-incumbents, 1789–2020

Democratic breakdowns are typically initiated by government incumbents or by domestic actors outside elected government, such as the military. The actors behind these two modes of breakdown often have different motives and capacities to undermine democracy, and they may therefore be influenced by different factors. We focus on two types of factors that may influence the probability of democratic breakdown: institutional constraints on the executive and external shocks that can serve as focal points for collective action. We theorize that the former is more relevant to the risk of incumbent-led breakdowns and the latter to non-incumbent takeovers. Our panel regression analysis of democratic regime spells since 1789 in almost 130 countries shows that economic crises, one relevant form of shock, are associated with non-incumbent but not incumbent takeovers, while regional democratic breakdown, another shock, shows no association with either mode. In contrast, institutional constraints on the executive are linked to both modes. These findings only partially align with our theoretical argument. On this basis, we discuss alternative explanations, such as rival elites preemptively acting against perceived threats from opposing groups.