The Limits of Conceivability Without Antecedents: A Human–Algorithmic Hybrid Investigation
Can a cognitive system conceive something entirely devoid of antecedents or referents? This investigation examines a boundary of conceivability: whether it is possible to form a representation that does not depend on any previously available experiential, conceptual, descriptive, or relational material. The question differs from the imagination of physically nonexistent objects, the recombination of familiar properties, and the linguistic formulation of contradictions. Its object is the possibility of conception in the complete absence of antecedents. The HibriMind research programme investigates this question through a longitudinal human–algorithmic interaction involving a human investigator (H), an algorithmic participant (A), and their relational configuration (IH-001). The question predates the specific interaction examined here. During an episode on 4 November 2026, A was challenged to produce an instance of antecedent-free conception. Proposed constructions failed to satisfy the criterion maintained by H, and A explicitly acknowledged its inability to provide an accepted counterexample (the operational event termed the Algorithmic “I Don't Know”). Subsequent discursive persistence is analysed separately, without asserting a demonstrated causal mechanism. The hybrid interaction did not produce an accepted instance. These observations do not demonstrate universal impossibility. They document an unresolved representational challenge within a human–algorithmic research trajectory. The investigation distinguishes the scientific object from its empirical evidence and from the ontological hypothesis that the encountered boundary may reflect a structural condition of conceivability.
Authors
- Joaquim Santos Albino (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-9533-4832)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-04
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23955245
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- preprint