Europe, strategic constraint, and the politics of dependence: Rethinking strength, treaties, and the transatlantic bargain

Abstract The claim that Europe is strategically weak and incapable of defending itself, as most recently articulated by US President Donald Trump, has become a recurring feature of transatlantic political discourse in recent years. This article argues that Europe’s perceived weakness is not primarily the result of political complacency or strategic irresponsibility but rather the cumulative outcome of deliberate legal, institutional, and normative constraints embedded in the post–WWII security order. Through an examination of key security and arms control and non-proliferation treaties – the Helsinki Final Act, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – the article demonstrates how Europe internalised a security architecture largely shaped by US and Soviet (later Russian) strategic preferences. While these regimes promised stability and the gradual replacement of military power with economic integration and diplomacy, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has exposed their fragility and the asymmetries they produced. The article further situates contemporary US pressure on Europe, including demands for increased defence spending amidst questions of whether the EU alone can project independent power to deter any potential threats in case of the United States’ withdrawal in its western hemisphere. It concludes that European rearmament and strategic autonomy are necessary but should be pursued within a renewed transatlantic compact grounded in international law, alliance solidarity, and shared democratic values.