Algorithms instead of adjudication: why?

This essay highlights and questions what it calls a ‘sceptical orthodoxy’ about human judgement, focussing upon judicial judgment in hard cases. It argues that juristic adherents of this orthodoxy move too quickly. They do so, first, by incautious extrapolation from the allegedly general insights of the orthodoxy to judgement in particular contexts, specifically judicial judgement in hard cases; second, by assuming that the insights of the orthodoxy are undeniable truths and, third, by invoking too stringent standards against which to measure human decision-making. Highlighting the haste in each move shows that there is in fact no unimpeachable orthodoxy here. And that fact undermines a standard refrain of juristic judgement sceptics: that deeply fallible human judges should be replaced by supposedly infallible algorithmic judgement systems. The essay concludes by highlighting some conditions which justify scepticism about the judgement of our fellow human beings.