A CRITIQUE OF KARL POPPER'S CRITERION OF FALSIFIABILITY IN SCIENCE

The paper critically analyzes Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability from the standpoint oflogical consistency, categorial precision, and the relation of a scientific theory to objectivereality. The starting point of the analysis is the distinction between the objectivity of atheory, its verifiability, and the result of verification. The main thesis of the paper is thatthe possibility of refuting a theory is not, in itself, a sufficient condition for establishing itsscientific value, nor does it prove its objective adequacy to the subject it determines. Asan alternative starting point, objectivity is considered as the fundamental criterion ofscientificity, whereby verifiability is determined as an inseparable condition of theassessment of objectivity, and intersubjective agreement as an element in thejustification of the results of that assessment. Particular attention is devoted to therelational nature of objectivity, the role of the subject in cognition, and the distinctionbetween the existence of an object and the establishment of a cognitive relation with it. Itis concluded that, in order to ground the proposed criterion, it is necessary to formallydetermine the meaning of objective conformity, the scope of verification, and theconditions under which the result of verification may be considered justified.Keywords: Karl Popper, falsifiability, scientificity, objectivity, verifiability, objective reality,subject, object, logical consistency.