被动型容器政党:极化社会第三党的共生范式与演化路径 The Passive Vessel Party: A Symbiotic Paradigm and Evolutionary Path for Third Parties in Polarized Societies

作者:郭洋洋Author: Guo YangyangORCID:0009-0006-6669-1790Contact email:[email protected] Type: PreprintSubmission Date: November 3, 2026Version: v1.0 Bilingual EditionPreprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23905091Open Access License: CC BY 4.0 摘要 既有政党理论与全球第三党实践均默认政党必须具备内生主体性与独立政策纲领,因而第三党始终难以摆脱“搅局者”困境与迪韦尔热定律的结构性挤压。本文提出一种新型政党形态——被动型容器政党,其核心特征是本体层面无内生实质意志,不主动创设政策目标,合法性派生并双重承认极化两端的正当诉求。该政党不以推翻两党格局、夺取执政主导权为初始目标,而是以两极张力为输入,以制度容器承载双极合法共生,通过推行—监督分职、极化伤害归责、程序化异议裁决三大机制,将表层互斥的价值主张转化为可控对撞的动态稳态。本文进一步以零轴锚定的力学隐喻具象化其运行逻辑:政党作为稳定零轴,其向心约束力并非内生主动施加,而是源自两党自身的分离冲动,极化越强则约束张力越大。本文勾勒其从摇摆州地方萌芽到执政终态的三阶段演化路径,阐明其防异化刚性约束,并验证其跨领域普适性:该范式不受议题类别限制,只要存在双极合法分歧即可适用;当社会达成共识时,政党功能局部休眠、价值外显,合法性持续存续。本文进一步将范式升维为通用程序型治理框架,指出其不绑定特定政党形态与政治制度,可适配多元载体与不同体制环境,具备跨语境普适性。本文指出:该范式反转了传统妥协理论的前提预设——两极极化与互斥并非该政党的生存障碍,恰恰是其存在价值与约束力量的来源。 关键词:被动型政党;容器政党;极化治理;双重合法性;向心约束;跨体制普适性 Abstract Existing party theory and global third-party practice universally presuppose that a political party must possess endogenous subjectivity and an independent policy agenda, leaving third parties perpetually trapped in the “spoiler” dilemma and the structural constraints of Duverger’s Law. This paper proposes a novel party form: the passive vessel party. Its defining feature is the absence of endogenous substantive will at its ontological core. It does not initiate policy goals on its own; its legitimacy is derivative, grounded in the dual recognition of the legitimate claims advanced by both poles of polarization. Rather than seeking to overthrow the two-party system or seize executive power as its primary objective, it takes bipolar tension as its input and functions as an institutional vessel sustaining lawful symbiosis between the two poles. Through three core mechanisms—implementation-oversight division of labor, party liability for polarization-induced harm, and procedural objection adjudication—it transforms seemingly mutually exclusive value claims into a dynamically stable state of controlled collision. This paper further illustrates its operational logic through the mechanical metaphor of zero-axis anchoring: as a stable zero axis within the political system, the party’s centripetal constraint is not actively imposed from within, but emerges from the two parties’ own impulse toward separation. The stronger the polarization, the greater the restraining tension. The paper outlines a three-stage evolutionary path from local emergence in swing states to a governing end-state, specifies its rigid anti-alienation constraints, and verifies its cross-domain applicability: the paradigm is not limited by issue area, and operates wherever legitimate bipolar disagreement exists. When social consensus emerges, the party’s function enters localized dormancy and its value is realized externally, while its legitimacy persists. This paper further upgrades the paradigm to a general procedural governance framework, pointing out that it is not bound to specific party forms or political systems, but can adapt to multiple carriers and different institutional contexts, with cross-context generalizability. This paper reverses the foundational premise of conventional compromise theory: bipolar polarization and mutual exclusivity are not obstacles to the party’s survival. They are, rather, the very source of its value and restraining power. Keywords: Passive Party; Vessel Party; Polarization Governance; Dual Legitimacy; Centripetal Constraint; Cross-Institutional Generalizability