Security Risks of Centralized Satellite Internet in Junta-Led Sahel States

This article examines the security and governance implications of expanding low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet infrastructure across the central Sahel, focusing on Niger, Mali, and Chad. Drawing on open-source intelligence, regulatory developments, and regional security assessments, it explores how commercial satellite connectivity, particularly Starlink, simultaneously improves digital access and enables violent extremist organizations to coordinate activities beyond conventional telecommunications networks. The analysis investigates the shift toward centralized licensing and state-controlled distribution systems, highlighting how these arrangements create new vulnerabilities involving illicit equipment trafficking, cyberattacks, signal jamming, and government coercion. It further considers the implications of emerging satellite cooperation between the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and Russia, particularly the risks of replacing existing technological dependencies with new forms of external control. The article argues that while centralized satellite governance may strengthen regulatory oversight and national security capabilities, concentrating critical connectivity within limited institutional and technical chokepoints increases exposure to disruption, undermines infrastructure resilience, and raises broader concerns about digital sovereignty, authoritarian control, and regional security.