El libre desarrollo de la personalidad en México: hacia un modelo garantista

In the second half of the 1940s, the concept of human dignity was given legal expression in international instruments. This article aims to identify and analyze the grounds on which restrictions on the right to free development of personality have been accepted in Mexico and other Latin American countries, and to argue for excluding public order, or any other concept whose scope is ambigu-ous, as a basis for restriction. Methodologically, this study adopts a qualitative approach, using legal hermeneutics and comparative methods through a review of international instruments and Latin American constitutions as primary sources, and scholarly literature as a secondary source, alongside an analysis of the reasoning adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the SupremeCourt of Justice of Mexico, and the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. The results show that human dignity givessubstance to the right to free development of personality. This right enables recognition of new forms of individual freedom and thereby contributes to more inclusive societies. The right derives from personal autonomy and guarantees that each person can envision and shape their lives as they choose. Within the Inter‐American human rights system and, correspondingly, in Mexico and other Latin American countries, this right is subject to limits based on respect for others and public order. The articleexamines how the ambiguity of public order poses a risk of arbitrariness, and concludes that it should not be invoked as a basis for restriction, with Ecuador serving as a leading reference in this regard.