Demand Distribution and Resource Allocation Efficiency: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Examination

The choice of resource allocation mechanism is one of the core issues in economics. Existing literature predominantly compares the efficiency differences between planned and market allocation from the dimensions of information costs and incentive mechanisms, but few studies incorporate "demand structure characteristics" as a key variable determining the effectiveness of allocation mechanisms. This paper proposes a theoretically original hypothesis: the efficiency of resource allocation in a system depends on the shape of its demand distribution. For resource allocation demands that are single-purpose, structurally simple, centrally planned allocation possesses comparative advantages in low information costs, small coordination costs, and strong mobilization capacity, enabling high efficiency; whereas for allocation demands characterized by diversified needs, strong preference heterogeneity, and highly dispersed information, decentralized market mechanisms can rapidly transmit and integrate information through price signals, thereby achieving superior allocation efficiency. Drawing on the historical experience of Soviet wartime communism and peacetime planned economy, the contrast of economic growth before and after China's reform and opening-up, the internal hierarchical allocation practices of business organizations, and institutional transformation practices in other countries as empirical materials, this paper systematically tests the hypothesis through case comparisons, time-series analysis, cross-country comparisons, and micro-organizational analysis. The study finds a significant matching effect between the shape of demand distribution and the allocation mechanism—not only at the macro level, but also at the micro level where economic entities (firms, organizations), due to their relatively single-dimensional demands, are also suitable for internal planned allocation. This finding has important theoretical value and policy implications for understanding institutional choice, institutional reform, and delineating the boundary between a "capable government" and an "effective market."