The Other Side of Industrial Ignorance-Making: Did Society's Response Change After Disclosure?

Industries have often said one thing while knowing the opposite. The previous paper showed this "gap between knowing and saying" in six industrial sectors, and it left three questions open. Did companies intend to deceive? Did what they said change what people believed? And when the facts came out, what changed? This paper maps the existing evidence for each question. The evidence comes from a repeatable search of one database (175 queries, 34,709 works) and from reading the key sources. The result is uneven. On intent, we have documents and rulings, but a plea proves intent to deceive only for Purdue, and only for the company, in its dealings with physicians and one regulator. On effect, few studies separate an industry message from the product itself. Those that do test belief and risk perception in short experiments, not behaviour. After disclosure, we can see consequences for the company. We cannot see consequences for the public, at least not in a design that isolates the effect of disclosure itself. For ignorance studies, this means that the "maker" half of ignorance-making is documented, while the "receiver" half is almost unmeasured. This absence of evidence belongs to our search. It does not prove an absence of effect.