Quining qualia again. Ten reasons

Qualia have long occupied a central place in the science and philosophy of consciousness, often invoked as the subjective residue that eludes physical explanation. In this paper, we argue that the classical concept faces serious explanatory and ontological difficulties. We present 10 reasons for setting it aside: (1) its unstable causal status; (2) the regress of the inner observer; (3) the absence of a determinate neuroscientific target; (4) the lack of autonomous empirical evidence for a quale as such; (5) its epistemic redundancy and duplication of properties already attributed to the world; (6) the reflexive architecture that makes experience available in a first-person format; (7) the limits and reconstructive character of introspection; (8) linguistic reification; (9) the apparent immediacy of experience; and (10) the persistence of residual dualist pictures. We do not deny that experiences occur, differ qualitatively, and are undergone from a first-person point of view. We reject the stronger interpretation of those differences as intrinsic, ineffable, immediately self-revealing, and metaphysically private properties located in an inner mental domain.