STABLENOTES V1 WHITEPAPER —Owner-Bound Offline Transaction Authorization for Stablecoins and Tokenized Assets

Stablenotes v1 is a non-custodial authorization architecture for stablecoins and other tokenized assets. Its target workflow combines a dedicated Secure Issuance Terminal, protected physical authorization media, a separately controlled owner factor, an isolated transaction signer and an owner-bound asset-control policy. The architecture is SDK-integrable; its security claims depend on the implementation and evidence gates in this whitepaper. A post-quantum authorization extension remains a separately gated proposed profile. The security rationale is structural. Remote attackers can compromise an issuance dependency, manipulate the transaction shown to an operator, inject an apparently authorized command, or exploit an external verifier without extracting a private key from a secure element. Independently governed factors and an enforceable policy are intended to make compromise of an ordinary online workflow insufficient to authorize a protected transfer [R22–R27]. AI-assisted tools can increase the scale and speed of phishing, reconnaissance, malicious code development and other attack steps. The effect depends on the adversary and task; no claim is made that a particular cited incident used AI without incident-specific evidence. Defenders can also use AI to investigate and test systems, subject to independent verification. Documented incidents reinforce the need to protect the entire authorization workflow, not only the cryptographic device. They also show why weak entropy, compromised transaction presentation and external protocol failures must be assessed separately from direct key extraction. The 29 October 2026 Binance incident illustrates this distinction: Binance estimated approximately USD 6.3 billion in unauthorized hot-wallet outflows and reported no evidence of a private-key leak in its initial investigation. The FBI later attributed the theft to North Korea’s TraderTraitor. The incident illustrates a threat scenario. It should not be considered as a test of this product [R31, R35]. Another threat which is not yet a reality but that can become real is quantum computing (QC). A sufficiently capable quantum computer could compromise widely used classical public-key signatures and key-establishment schemes. Arrival timing remains uncertain. Captured ciphertext may face future decryption, while exposed classical public keys may enable future private-key derivation and signature forgery. The resulting product requirement is clear. For custody profiles that require offline continuity, resistance to remotely scalable compromise and separation of possession from authorization, a separately controlled offline factor is not an optional convenience. It is a mandatory compensating control. Stablenotes conforms to that requirement only if possession of the note is insufficient to reconstruct the wallet secret or direct funds to an arbitrary destination.