Degismisism: Justified Change in Knowledge, Epistemic Flexibility, and Critical Continuity
Degismisism: Justified Change in Knowledge, Epistemic Flexibility, and Critical Continuity Author: Ali DeğişmişPublication version: DGS-Y1.0DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23877575 Abstract Degismisism is a conceptual philosophical framework proposed by Ali Değişmiş that examines the question: What justifies change? The framework argues that change does not possess intrinsic epistemic value merely because it occurs. Instead, revising, provisionally retaining, or suspending a judgment should depend on the quality of available evidence, the strength of justification, and the reliability of the methods used to evaluate knowledge claims. The study introduces a two-stage decision model distinguishing confidence adjustment from the subsequent decision to retain, revise, or suspend judgment. It further develops a Justification Matrix, procedural decision rules, and a method-review process addressing the possibility that the criteria used to evaluate evidence may themselves require correction. Drawing on selected literature in epistemology, scientific reasoning, metacognition, and belief revision, the paper identifies conceptual relationships without claiming to replace existing philosophical traditions. The manuscript proposes testable hypotheses and research procedures for future empirical evaluation. Its scope concerns assessable knowledge claims and does not extend to determining the truth of personal or religious faith. Research status: This publication presents a theoretical and methodological proposal. It does not claim completed empirical validation, demonstrated superiority over existing approaches, or independent peer-reviewed acceptance. Languages: English and Turkish. Both documents represent the same research publication under a single DOI.
Authors
- Ali Değişmiş
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-02
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23877574
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- preprint