From issue linkage to structural lock-in: explaining the Karabakh constraint in Türkiye-Armenia relations

This article examines how an issue linkage initially adopted as a strategic policy choice can become difficult to reverse through third-party influence. It develops the concept of structural lock-in through three mechanisms: external cost imposition, domestic ratification constraints, and reputational risks. Using process tracing, the article examines Türkiye’s linkage of normalization with Armenia to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1991 to 2026, focusing on 1993, the 2009 Zurich Protocols, and the post-2020 normalization process. The findings show that Azerbaijan acquired de facto veto capacity by shaping these three dimensions of costs confronting Turkish decision-makers, thereby narrowing politically feasible alternatives. The post-2020 period shows that structural lock-in is neither permanent nor deterministic. Changed regional conditions and Azerbaijan’s support for coordinated normalization partially loosened these constraints without complete delinking. The article challenges assumptions that issue linkage is dyadic and readily reversible, showing how third-party influence can consolidate and reconfigure strategic linkages.