Poland's Constitutional Crisis: An Analysis Through Constitutional Civic Realism (CCR)

Abstract This paper examines Poland's constitutional crisis through the framework of Constitutional Civic Realism (CCR), which holds that the fundamental purpose of constitutional government is to prevent the concentration of unaccountable power. Poland's disputes over judicial appointments, presidential authority, and the Constitutional Tribunal reveal a structural weakness in constitutional design: institutions intended to check one another may become instruments of partisan control when political actors reject the principle of reciprocal accountability. The analysis introduces the concept of adversarial constitutional capture, in which political movements exploit constitutional procedures, institutional appointments, and legal ambiguities to weaken the very safeguards intended to constrain their power. The paper distinguishes legal authority, democratic authorization, and civic legitimacy, arguing that electoral victory does not confer unlimited authority over independent institutions. It also contrasts Poland's experience of partisan institutional capture with the influence of corporate and organized economic power in the United States, illustrating how different concentrations of power can undermine constitutional accountability. The paper proposes institutional safeguards, including independent judicial nomination, protections against procedural obstruction, impartial constitutional dispute resolution, and stronger separation between political parties and oversight institutions. Its central conclusion is that a constitution must not merely distribute power among institutions; it must remain capable of preventing unaccountable power even when political actors deliberately seek to evade constitutional restraints.