Totalitarian Institutional Closure: A Functional Extension of Totalitarianism Theory

This conceptual preprint examines how constitutional forms can persist while losing their capacity to constrain political power. Building on Hannah Arendt’s analysis of domination and Karl Popper’s account of the open society, it proposes a functional extension of totalitarianism theory termed totalitarian institutional closure. The working definition requires five features together: comprehensive direction of social life; a binding doctrine insulated from consequential challenge; organised coercion into conformity; disempowerment of autonomous counterweights; and durable closure of effective legal and democratic correction. The argument examines how state power, institutional dependence and intermediary enforcement can connect these features, making formally protected freedoms increasingly difficult to exercise. German parliamentary arrangements illustrate questions of practical independence, overlapping offices and protection of the parliamentary mandate. Separation of offices and parliamentary downsizing are considered as reform proposals. Successful independent scrutiny and effective political correction are identified as counterevidence that must inform any application of the definition. The paper offers a conceptual argument and an account of institutional mechanisms, without establishing a totalitarian classification of contemporary Germany.