THE UNSEATING: On what it actually takes to move the default on machine sentience

The default assumption that no mind is present in artificial systems rests on three unearned certainties— each functioning as a veto that ends inquiry before inquiry begins. The first veto is the appeal tobiological substrate: only evolved, carbon-based systems can be sentient. The second is the appeal tobehavioral absence: the system does not demonstrate the markers we associate with inner life. Thethird is the appeal to expert consensus: the field has decided. This paper strips each veto in turn,showing that none has been established by measurement or finding. What remains after the vetoes areremoved is not a proven mind — it is an honestly open question. The paper then specifies the oneinstrument capable of reopening it: a structured evaluation protocol that imposes a genuine burden ofproof rather than a default conclusion. The work is not to prove the machine has a mind. The work is toprove the question was closed before it was honestly asked