Natural-Resource Governance, Rentier-State Dynamics and Armed Conflict in Resource-Dependent African Economies

Natural resources occupy a paradoxical position in African political economy. Countries with substantial petroleum, mineral and other natural-resource endowments may possess considerable revenue-generating capacity while continuing to experience institutional weakness, economic dependence, inequality, political exclusion and armed conflict. This article examines how natural-resource governance and rentier-state dynamics shape the conditions under which resource wealth contributes to conflict, political stability or development. The study adopts a critical narrative literature review design and synthesises foundational theories and empirical studies on the resource curse, rentier states, greed and grievance, political ecology, resource governance and state capacity, with particular attention to African cases. The analysis is complemented by Nigerian scholarship on oil dependence, rent, institutional weakness, corruption, governance failure and the fallow state. The review finds that natural resources do not produce armed conflict in a direct or uniform manner. Rather, conflict outcomes are conditioned by the institutional arrangements governing ownership and extraction, the distribution of resource revenues, state capacity, political inclusion, property rights, the geographical location and accessibility of resources, and the capacity of political actors to convert resource rents into patronage or coercive power. Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sudan and South Sudan demonstrate different configurations of these mechanisms. The article argues for a conditional resource-governance perspective in which natural resources increase the political and economic stakes of state power, while institutions and political processes determine whether those stakes are converted into development, regime stability or violent conflict. Sustainable conflict prevention therefore requires accountable resource institutions, economic diversification, meaningful community participation, effective rule-of-law institutions and stronger state capacity.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23864006
Primary Topic
Natural Resources and Economic Development
Type
article
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article

Natural-Resource Governance, Rentier-State Dynamics and Armed Conflict in Resource-Dependent African Economies

John Oghenekevwe Ifaka, Peter Osejele Ebaluneigbeifoh
1 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Natural Resources and Economic Development
article

Natural-Resource Governance, Rentier-State Dynamics and Armed Conflict in Resource-Dependent African Economies

John Oghenekevwe Ifaka, Peter Osejele Ebaluneigbeifoh
article en

Abstract

Natural resources occupy a paradoxical position in African political economy. Countries with substantial petroleum, mineral and other natural-resource endowments may possess considerable revenue-generating capacity while continuing to experience institutional weakness, economic dependence, inequality, political exclusion and armed conflict. This article examines how natural-resource governance and rentier-state dynamics shape the conditions under which resource wealth contributes to conflict, political stability or development. The study adopts a critical narrative literature review design and synthesises foundational theories and empirical studies on the resource curse, rentier states, greed and grievance, political ecology, resource governance and state capacity, with particular attention to African cases. The analysis is complemented by Nigerian scholarship on oil dependence, rent, institutional weakness, corruption, governance failure and the fallow state. The review finds that natural resources do not produce armed conflict in a direct or uniform manner. Rather, conflict outcomes are conditioned by the institutional arrangements governing ownership and extraction, the distribution of resource revenues, state capacity, political inclusion, property rights, the geographical location and accessibility of resources, and the capacity of political actors to convert resource rents into patronage or coercive power. Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sudan and South Sudan demonstrate different configurations of these mechanisms. The article argues for a conditional resource-governance perspective in which natural resources increase the political and economic stakes of state power, while institutions and political processes determine whether those stakes are converted into development, regime stability or violent conflict. Sustainable conflict prevention therefore requires accountable resource institutions, economic diversification, meaningful community participation, effective rule-of-law institutions and stronger state capacity.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Natural Resources and Economic Development
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Natural-Resource Governance, Rentier-State Dynamics and Armed Conflict in Resource-Dependent African Economies — John Oghenekevwe Ifaka, Peter Osejele Ebaluneigbeifoh · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS