Constitutional Operating Systems
Every operating system enforces a constitution. It determines which artifacts may bind, which effects may execute, who may amend system behavior, and under what authority changes become legitimate. Yet in contemporary computing stacks this constitutional layer is rarely explicit. It is distributed across codebases, build systems, vendor signing infrastructure, community governance processes, configuration files, and undocumented assumptions. This paper formalizes the "constitutional layer" of computing as a first-class, inspectable artifact--proposing a structural method to make authority, admissibility, and amendment in operating systems auditable by design. Using the Specification--Configuration--Implementation (SCI) lens and the Meta-Compilation Intermediate Representation (MCIR) substrate introduced in prior work , we analyze major OS families as distinct constitutional arrangements and outline how a constitutional operating system could render its governance layer structurally visible. The claim is architectural. It does not seek to centralize control or eliminate trust. It seeks to reveal the governance that already exists. \newpage
Authors
- Adam Ableman
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-10-31
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23848663
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00