TAXING NATURAL RESOURCE RENT IN UZBEKISTAN: THE SPECIAL RENT TAX AND A THREE-STAGE FISCAL REGIME FOR SUBSOIL USE

The article examines the role of resource taxes in the state budget revenues of Uzbekistan and the design of the fiscal regime for subsoil use. Based on 2017–2025 data, it shows that revenues from the subsoil use tax grew 7.4 times but remained highly volatile because of their dependence on world commodity prices. Drawing on the resource rent tax concept of Garnaut and Clunies Ross and on the experience of Norway, Australia and Kazakhstan, the article substantiates a three-stage regime consisting of a moderate resource tax, the profit tax and a special rent tax levied after project payback. An illustrative calculation demonstrates how the uplift mechanism defers the special rent tax liability until accumulated costs are recovered. Recommendations are made on project-level ring-fencing, the uplift rate, deductible costs and the stabilization of resource revenues.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-10-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23832984
Primary Topic
Natural Resources and Economic Development
Type
article
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article

TAXING NATURAL RESOURCE RENT IN UZBEKISTAN: THE SPECIAL RENT TAX AND A THREE-STAGE FISCAL REGIME FOR SUBSOIL USE

Дилшод Шухратович Султанов
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Natural Resources and Economic Development
article

TAXING NATURAL RESOURCE RENT IN UZBEKISTAN: THE SPECIAL RENT TAX AND A THREE-STAGE FISCAL REGIME FOR SUBSOIL USE

Дилшод Шухратович Султанов
article en

Abstract

The article examines the role of resource taxes in the state budget revenues of Uzbekistan and the design of the fiscal regime for subsoil use. Based on 2017–2025 data, it shows that revenues from the subsoil use tax grew 7.4 times but remained highly volatile because of their dependence on world commodity prices. Drawing on the resource rent tax concept of Garnaut and Clunies Ross and on the experience of Norway, Australia and Kazakhstan, the article substantiates a three-stage regime consisting of a moderate resource tax, the profit tax and a special rent tax levied after project payback. An illustrative calculation demonstrates how the uplift mechanism defers the special rent tax liability until accumulated costs are recovered. Recommendations are made on project-level ring-fencing, the uplift rate, deductible costs and the stabilization of resource revenues.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Natural Resources and Economic Development
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