Competition under Consent: Member States and Allocation in the European Defence Fund (EDF), 2018–2026

The European Defence Fund (EDF) is usually debated as a choice between excellence and geography. This paper asks where member states enter its allocation. Firms compete for awards, but every work programme and every award needs the consent of a committee of member states, and no development action can be proposed without national backing. The paper compares funding and coordination with budget contributions and with civil EU research, reads the Regulation and its negotiation, and traces the one documented correction of a competitive result. It finds three things. First, Spain's coordination share in the EDF matches its share in competitive civil research almost exactly, and its high funding ratio (1.67) is partly matched there too: against the civil benchmark its excess is smaller than France's or Italy's. France's leadership, 2.7 times its civil share, is specific to defence. Second, the veto that turns consent into control was demanded by France in 2018 to steer the fund, while spreading by rule was the Commission's design. Third, consent was used once against a competitive outcome: a direct award in 2023 to the French-led consortium that had lost the 2021 interceptor call. An amendment signed in October 2026 moves more of allocation under consent, making cross-border cooperation an optional criterion chosen call by call in the work programme. The record supports competition backed by active states, not a hidden juste retour, although the rankings that would settle the question are classified. Five predictions on the defence window of the European Competitiveness Fund are registered. The evidence extends to material published on 31 October 2026, including reporting on member-state divisions over the European Competitiveness Fund.