ANTI–COMPETITIVENESS AND SMART SPECIALIZATION: LEADERSHIP UNDER END–GAME–BEHAVIOR AND POLICY COSTS

The interaction of public policies with good–service markets represents a necessity for smart specialization. While theories and research explain functionality within theoretical postulates, little attention is paid to the adaptation of smart strategies and innovation in anti–competitive conditions. Often within exclusive territories and homogeneous groups, anti– competitiveness prevents the use of resources in new ways and goals, by limiting the potential for innovation in processes, technologies, markets and institutions, and highlighting leadership as cause and effect. The paper provides an analysis of the impact of leadership on innovation adoption, smart specialization policy and strategies, examining the potential policy gains or costs. The literature review, comparative analysis, public goods game theory and expertise were used to build the theoretical framework of the case study. The findings suggest that, while leadership dominates, unclear processes or un–public goals reduce trust, and under the end–game–effect of participant behavior, public policy costs may increase, making successful innovation non–winner.