Social Roles and Exculpatory Ignorance

People sometimes attempt to avoid blame with the following excuse: “I didn’t know I was doing anything wrong; I was just doing my job.” I argue that this excuse points towards a distinctive form of genuinely exculpatory ignorance. Complying with social role norms involves following deliberative norms that can explain agents’ claims of ignorance and mitigate their blameworthiness. My account of this experience makes a surprising contribution to the debate over when ignorance excuses. If we accept that nonculpable moral ignorance excuses, my argument highlights a novel form of ignorance that can be experienced by role occupants. On some views, however, what matters is being motivated by the right reasons (having a “good will”), so even nonculpably morally ignorant agents are blameworthy because they are not appropriately responsive to moral considerations. My account challenges the accepted view that having a good will just is responsiveness to moral reasons. I offer role occupants as a case study of moral ignorance with a good will. The fact that our social roles can lead to exculpatory ignorance in this ordinary and pervasive way opens up new territory for theories of moral responsibility.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Published
2026-10-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v31i6.6264
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Social Roles and Exculpatory Ignorance

Eliza Wells
2 links
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Social Roles and Exculpatory Ignorance

Eliza Wells
article en

Abstract

People sometimes attempt to avoid blame with the following excuse: “I didn’t know I was doing anything wrong; I was just doing my job.” I argue that this excuse points towards a distinctive form of genuinely exculpatory ignorance. Complying with social role norms involves following deliberative norms that can explain agents’ claims of ignorance and mitigate their blameworthiness. My account of this experience makes a surprising contribution to the debate over when ignorance excuses. If we accept that nonculpable moral ignorance excuses, my argument highlights a novel form of ignorance that can be experienced by role occupants. On some views, however, what matters is being motivated by the right reasons (having a “good will”), so even nonculpably morally ignorant agents are blameworthy because they are not appropriately responsive to moral considerations. My account challenges the accepted view that having a good will just is responsiveness to moral reasons. I offer role occupants as a case study of moral ignorance with a good will. The fact that our social roles can lead to exculpatory ignorance in this ordinary and pervasive way opens up new territory for theories of moral responsibility.

Journal of Ethics and Social PhilosophyVol. 31(6)
University of Manitoba (CA)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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Social Roles and Exculpatory Ignorance — Eliza Wells · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS