Technocentric Epistemic Injustice Beyond Identity-Based Prejudice

Abstract It has been argued that users of augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) are prone to a distinct kind of discrimination called speechism, due to their mode of communication being deemed inferior. This kind of discrimination originates from pervasive ableist oppression and thwarts users’ ability to have their experiences adequately heard in social settings, in which it is implicitly presumed that the only body capable of epistemic contribution is the able-bodied. This paper argues that speechism is akin to epistemic injustice, and more specifically to testimonial injustice. Speechism, however, highlights a gap in current epistemic injustice theory, as speakers suffering from testimonial injustice are usually thought to be the victims of some form of negative stereotyping and identity-based prejudice. In the case of AAC and speechism, I argue that the prejudice that results in epistemic injustice is not necessarily directed against the speaker but rather the medium that the speaker uses to communicate. As such, I defend the view that traditional epistemic injustice theory, as defended by Miranda Fricker, focuses too much on the speaker themselves and overlooks how modes of communication can also be vectors of testimonial injustice beyond being mere heuristics for negative stereotyping. I refer to this kind of epistemic injustice as technocentric epistemic injustice, where the technological means that allow for epistemic contribution and not the speaker themselves are prejudiced against.