Distinguishing Persuasion from Manipulation

Manipulation is widely regarded as a presumptively impermissible method of influence, in contrast to persuasion, which is usually presented as presumptively permissible. Calling something manipulative is typically a moral criticism; calling it persuasive is not. Although there is a flourishing philosophical literature on manipulation, that on persuasion is comparatively underdeveloped despite persuasion being one of the most common and important ways in which people influence one another. This article begins to remedy that situation. We present a novel account of persuasion, drawing on and explicating the distinction from manipulation. The aim is to show what persuasion is in such a way that explains why it is presumptively permissible, whereas manipulation is not. We first develop an account of manipulation by adapting an account recently defended by Robert Noggle. We then define nonmanipulative influence in general, then carve out persuasion therefrom. Throughout, we assume that persuasion is not manipulative. However, we are open to the possibility that there is in fact overlap between persuasion and manipulation, in which case the account we present is of specifically nonmanipulative persuasion, which we still take to be an interesting and important category of influence. We are also not concerned specifically with rational persuasion; our account allows for persuasion that need not be fully rational. The result is a holistic account that is useful in considering the nature and ethics of influence.