Zetetic Exclusion

Abstract This article examines the dynamics of inquiry under conditions of oppression. It presents an account of unjust zetetic exclusion , which arises when prejudice limits access to inquiry and the epistemic goods it yields. Unlike other forms of epistemic injustice, unjust zetetic exclusion need not result from a prejudicial credibility attribution. Instead, it may manifest even if one is perceived to be a highly competent and trustworthy inquirer, or even if one makes no judgment whatsoever regarding one’s zetetic capabilities. Unjust zetetic exclusion may result from prejudicial evaluations concerning who belongs within specific communities of inquiry and who should have access to, or possess knowledge about, a particular domain. Theories of epistemic injustice must account not only for how prejudice impacts credibility attributions but also how it regulates access to inquiry and shapes the conditions under which knowledge and other epistemic goods are acquired in the first place.