LLM eBay: A Simple and Truthful Marketplace for Fine-Tuned LLMs Trading
Personalized fine-tuning of Large Language Models (LLMs) enhances user experience but incurs substantial computational costs. Recent studies show that initializing training from a style-similar fine-tuned model reduces adaptation overhead, turning such checkpoints into reusable, tradable assets. A marketplace for these checkpoints, however, faces information asymmetry: sellers may misreport a checkpoint's style, while buyers cannot verify its usefulness before purchase, which invites adverse selection. We introduce LLM eBay, a simple single-round marketplace for trading fine-tuned LLMs. Sellers are paid per purchase at a posted price, and a truncated quadratic proper scoring rule adjusts each payment according to how well the seller's style report agrees with a style signal that the platform measures by generating text on hidden prompts. We show that the score elicits the verifier's expected signal, characterize exactly when truthful reporting is a seller best response under per-purchase demand, and bound the downside risk from noisy verification. In an end-to-end study with real LoRA checkpoints on two base models and three buyer tasks, LLM eBay reduces measured convergence steps by 8.5\% relative to retrieval over self-reported style (95\% CI [1.0\%, 15.9\%]). In model-based market simulations built on a measured style-to-cost relationship, it cuts style-claim error by 96.5\% (from 0.424 to 0.015), recovers 96.3\% of Oracle welfare, saves 72.4\% of the cost of fine-tuning from the base model, and keeps all providers profitable in the default setting.
Authors
- Miao Pan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2138-4413)
- Xingke Yang
- Tomoaki Ohtsuki
- Aohan Li
- Hui Zhong
- Xin Fu
- Zhu Han
- Jiachen Shen
Publication Details
- Journal
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Published
- 2026-10-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2610.39347
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- preprint