Provably Secure Diffusion Watermarking Against Removal Adversaries with Batched Detector Access

Recent latent-based watermarking methods can embed undetectable watermarks into AI-generated content. However, these approaches are vulnerable to removal attacks as their watermark detection boundaries are exposed, prompting the use of secret long-term transformations to hide these boundaries. We show that such defenses are insecure under a stronger threat model motivated by publicly reachable detectors: an adversary with batched detector access can reconstruct the transformations, permanently re-exposing the decision boundary. To address this, we propose a watermarking scheme based on a hybrid of long-term and one-time secret transformations, which prevents the reuse of structure across samples and keeps the long-term secret hidden. Besides undetectability, we show that this scheme is provably secure against removal adversaries with batched detector access, in the sense that no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary can achieve a non-negligible advantage over an adversary restricted to adding isotropic white-noise with a $\sqrt{2}\times$ larger perturbation budget, and we show this $\sqrt{2}$ factor to be tight. Evaluations on Stable Diffusion 2.1 and XL demonstrate the attack against the existing defense, and show that our scheme preserves generation quality and withstands common perturbations and targeted removal attacks.