Institutional (іm)Perfection of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Judges

The article examines the institutional architecture of disciplinary proceedings against judges. It argues that institutional quality should be assessed not by the formal number of bodies and stages, but by the distribution of authority over the initiation of proceedings, definition of their subject matter, preparation and adoption of decisions, internal review and judicial correction. The article aims to establish criteria for the institutional excellence of disciplinary proceedings against judges and to evaluate the Ukrainian model against them. The study employs system-structural, functional, and comparative legal methods, as well as the method of legal regulation. The study analyses access to the disciplinary complaint mechanism, prioritisation criteria, the functional relationship between the Disciplinary Inspectorate Service and the Disciplinary Chambers of the High Council of Justice, the incompatibility of roles in initiating and deciding a case, and the adequacy of review by the plenary High Council of Justice and by courts. It considers the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, including Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, Denisov v. Ukraine and Shevchuk v. Ukraine, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, CCJE Opinion No. 27 (2024), Venice Commission Joint Opinion CDL-AD(2025)044, and relevant scholarly works. The article proposes institutional capacity to correct error as an original criterion of institutional quality. It concludes that personal separation of roles is necessary but insufficient without informational autonomy, adequate jurisdiction of the reviewing body and timely correction. Legislative proposals concern legitimate interest in filing complaints, exhaustive prioritisation criteria, incompatibility rules, independent reasoning and empirical evaluation of disciplinary institutions.