Are there too many reasons?

Many philosophers endorse the view that normative reasons for action are often explained by our desires, but the right kind of desire that warrants reason-explaining status remains a topic of debate. The non-ideal theory of desire-based reasons, which asserts that actual intrinsic desires explain normative reasons for action, faces criticism for allowing reasons to exist in cases where we intuitively believe they do not. In this article, I defend the non-ideal theory against this “Too Many Reasons” objection. I argue that the error-based or ignorance-based characteristics of an actual intrinsic desire are not directly relevant to its ability to explain normative reasons for action. Meanwhile, the intuition that some intrinsic desires target inappropriate objects, leading us to believe that there is no reason to pursue them, does not genuinely challenge the non-ideal view. This holds true provided we distinguish between different usages of the word “reason.” Therefore, the non-ideal theory of desire-based reasons can be upheld against the criticism that it allows too many reasons.