Hegemony and Its Extended Phenotypes: A Critique of Gramscian Assumptions Through Extended Phenotype Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory

Gramsci explains political durability through relations of intellectual and moral leadership embedded in institutions, material compromises, and coercion. This paper asks whether his account sufficiently distinguishes the reproduction of a political vehicle from the transmission of its doctrine, the consent of its participants, the interests of those represented, and the truth of its claims. It develops a textual critique of four Prison Notebooks using Extended Phenotype Theory of Law and evolutionary game theory as analytical resources whose own assumptions remain contestable. Seven tensions organize the argument: the aggregation of classes and organizations; the specification of an essential economic core; the party as a moral reference; pedagogical reciprocity without guaranteed error correction; historical unification without sufficient warrant for truth; collective will under persistent pluralism; and consent without enforceable limits on the continuation of power. Documentary illustrations from Argentina before and during Javier Milei's presidency concern universities, trade unions, INADI, governmental coalition building, and protest around Congress. They show why institutional persistence, administrative dissolution, mobilization, and legislative success require different interpretations. The figure of Cincinnatus and the captured renewer problem distinguish relinquishing office, restoring competences, and preserving independent controls. The contribution is a conceptual disaggregation and a set of discriminating research predictions, not an estimate of hegemonic influence or an empirical validation of EPT/EGT. A plural institutional order requires supports that let citizens reject a leadership and institutions constrain it, including when it remains popular.