Discrimination in Bureaucratic Recruitment Under Civil Service Exams

ABSTRACT Meritocratic recruitment is a central tenet in Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which states that employees should be hired based on merit. However, extensive research has shown evidence of hiring discrimination against minorities, breaking with basic principles in bureaucratic selection. This paper examines whether ethnic and racial minorities are discriminated against when bureaucratic organizations use civil service exams to assess candidates' merit and fitness for positions. Drawing on data from the local government of New York City and a candidate list fixed effects approach, we find that Black and Hispanic candidates are slightly more likely to be hired than White candidates with similar exam scores, suggesting that these ethnic minorities hold a small advantage in bureaucratic selection. However, examining the starting compensation levels of new hires, we show that minorities are hired at lower salaries and are compensated less for high exam scores than comparable White hires. Our findings suggest that civil service exams might be an important lever for securing fair and unbiased bureaucratic selection but also that they do not prevent discrimination in later steps of the recruitment process.