How Does a Public Tally Affect When Voters Vote? Evidence from Online Roll Call Voting

Do voters ``signal'' their decisions by voting early, or do they ``snipe'' by casting their votes at the last minute? In the transparent sequential roll call voting of the U.S. House of Representatives, members can strategically choose when to cast their votes, but the timing of those votes is hard to observe and analyze. This paper examines the effect of a public tally on vote timing in a setting that records it exactly: corporate shareholder voting at a blockchain-based startup (DAO) whose roll call votes transitioned from private one-stage voting to transparent sequential voting. I collected individual-level voting records, delegated voting power, and precise vote timing. Fixed-effect regressions show that introducing a public tally increases the likelihood of early voting (signaling) or last-minute voting (sniping), consistent with game-theoretic predictions. Interaction estimates are consistent with more pivotal voters, measured by the Shapley-Shubik index, using early votes as signals rather than waiting to snipe. These results suggest that a public tally may harm information aggregation, as signaling can intensify the influence of pivotal voters.